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Abstract-This paper presents a model for the mechanism of creativity which is derived 
from the concepts and conclusions of analytic psychology. Creativity is presented as 
the intended goal of sexual staging with each of the three stages oral, anal, and genital 
yielding a distinct psychic subsystem which is integral to the mechanism. The influence 
of pathology on the mechanism as well as the ontogenetic roots of the mechanism are 
also presented. Finally this qualitative outline is made precise with a quantitative model 
for the mechanism of creativity. This model is presented in algorithmic form suitable 
for simulation on a digital computer. The algorithm is also shown to implicitly accom- 
modate pathology and ontogenesis. Its structure and mechanics are illustrated with an 
example from infancy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Dreaming and creativity have historically been regarded as being related. Similarly, the 
empirical sciences and reality testing have also been seen as being related. If the termi- 
nology of analytic psychology is adopted and if dreaming is identified with primary process 
activity and reality testing with secondary process activity then the key to the mechanism 
of creativity presents itself. (Terms from psychoanalytic theory such as primary and sec- 
ondary process are defined in Appendix A. Further definition is given in the body of this 
paper as required.) 
This paper presents a model for creativity by examining the response of man in the 
adult state to an adaptive demand. This response which is characterized by the identity 
creativity = adaptivity is, in a sense to be detailed below, a replication of a prototype 
achieved in the Oedipal epoch of development. More primitively the primary and sec- 
ondary process contributions to the creative response are replications of prototypes from 
the oral and anal epochs respectively[l]. 
This suggests a natural sequence of exposition for this paper. First the mechanism in 
the mature (adult) state will be outlined. Then the psychic subsystems identified in the 
mechanism will be traced to their ontogenetic[2] roots. (Ontogenesis is defined here in 
its usual sense: the study of the developmental/maturational sequence from birth onward). 
Next the concept of psycho-pathology = maladaptivity = failure at creativity will be 
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developed, i. e., psychopathology as a defensive process will be related to (implied) failure 
to achieve the Oedipal prototype referred to above. Finally the mechanism of creativity 
will be mathematically formulated in an algorithm suitable for simulation. The algorithm 
will then be generalized to accommodate ontogenesis and therefore psychopathology. The 
algorithm is demonstrated with an example. 
While cognitive studies can be said to address the purely mental, and pathological 
studies the purely affectual and instinctual, the study of creativity enjoys no such purity. 
Clearly creativity is a consummate life process which involves all psychic capacities from 
the purely instinctual through the affectual to the purely cognitive. This is altogether 
adaptively appropriate: the creative concept must on the one hand be formulated and on 
the other it must be carried out. Formulation and execution exhaust the three levels of 
psychic activity (these being instinctual, affectual and cognitive-see Appendix A) and 
also include somatic mobilization. In a word, the study of the creative mechanism has 
one foot in the mental and the other in the sexual, and yet both mental and sexual are 
fully biological with the mental having been derived from the sexual. 
CREATIVITY IN THE MATURE STATE 
Freud saw dreaming as having the adaptive significance of preserving sleep in the 
presence of ongoing wishful tendencies. In his model these wishful tendencies could derive 
from unresolved archaic adaptive efforts of infancy and childhood or could be cf recent 
origin. He saw the non-cognitive elements of the wish-the affectual and instinctual ele- 
ments-as the most prior source of dreaming. Indeed dreams are notorious for defying 
cognitive logic. Freud sought a logical characterization for the mechanism involved in 
dream formation even if the dream process were driven by instinctual and affectual 
sources. He identified this logic at the level of affect as characterizable by distortion, 
displacement, and condensation. 
The dream process then was driven by a wishful tendency current in the unconscious 
into sleep. This process sought to synthesize a scenario-mostly visual but perhaps also 
having other sensory percepts-by combining object representations (sensory and affec- 
tual) associated with the wish according to the mechanisms of distortion, displacement, 
and condensation. Such mechanisms furthermore were adaptively necessary for the ego 
to present hallucinatory wish fulfilling material in the presence of superego and/or reality 
constraints. In a word, the dream mechanism seeks to satisfy the real instinctual content 
of the wish with unreal and apparently unrelated material (unrelated to the wish cogni- 
tively). The product of the dream process is a fiction and need be nothing more. The 
entire process of dream formation takes place in his model at the level of the primary 
process which could be regarded as having more id relatedness than reality relatedness. 
It can be shown that the adaptive responses at the levels of instinct, affect, and cognition 
have axiomatic characterizations which are increasingly reality related in the order 
given[l]. Let the creative situation be defined by a wish W to resolve an demand. Let W 
be defined by its cognitive attributes {c,> and affectual attributes {a,,}. The affect al, is 
associated with certain cognitive attributes {ck,}, i. e., the perception of c~, arouses affect 
uk for each j. For each uI, one or severa! cx,‘s are selected which are sufficiently near 
the cognitive attributes {ci} of W. The result is a collection, say C, of cognitive attributes 
which 
i) carry the affects of W and 
ii) are sufficiently close to W cognitively. 
The elements of C are potential descriptors of a solution to W. The mechanism thus far 
is a restatement of the beginning of the dream process. 
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(A cognitive attribute is defined as a descriptive phrase; cognate and cognitive attribute 
are used interchangeably here. The notation used implies nothing regarding the number 
of attributes. Also instinctual attributes are not included because 
i) there are only two classes of instinct (sexual and aggressive) and 
ii) affects of low differentiation (such as rage) are close to instincts. 
It is irrelevant if W derives from inner or outer sources. An intrapsychic W would tend 
to have more affectual than cognitive attributes (when compared to an extrapsychic W) 
while an extrapsychic W would tend to have more cognitive than affectual attributes (when 
compared to an extrapsychic W) while an extrapsychic W would tend to have more cog- 
nitive than affectual attributes (when compared to an intrapsychic W). This places in- 
trapsychic W’s nearer dreaming and extrapsychic W’s nearer creativity in the ordinary 
sense of the word. Yet both sources, as well as combinations, can drive the creative 
process.) 
Were a dream to be synthesized then constraints would be imposed upon C and material 
to be derived from it. Such constraints would derive more from superego pressure than 
from reality. In ideal creativity only reality is a constraining source; in the real (subideal, 
suboptimal) personality constraints derive both from superego and reality. 
If a dream were to be formed then the elements of C would be synthesized by choosing 
known object representations which carry as attributes elements of C. Those elements 
of C whose object representatives are too close affectually (or cognitively) to W would 
be censored by the superego or other real limitations in the process. A new synthesis 
would be attempted, the prior one aborted probably by deforming it continuously into the 
new one. In this process cognitive distance of the dream is increased away from W; 
affectual distance is also increased as necessary away from the original cz!, . (The meaning 
of “near” will be made precise later.) The outcome is a relocation of the affects mx onto 
cognitive attributes <j which carry ax to a suitably small degree in normal response. In 
other words the dream process seeks to preserve the affects of the wish by representing 
them with objects that do not logically carry those affects beyond a certain degree which 
is defined by superego or reality constraints. 
The above paragraph is a loose qualitative description of dream formation. To present 
the mechanism of creativity less ambiguity is essential especially in defining “synthesis.” 
(The description of this sections remains qualitative. Ambiguity will be resolved more 
fully in a later section where this is presented symbolically. Ambiguity over “distance” 
will also be addressed there.) The essence of the dream mechanism is a primary process 
synthesis of representatives of C subject to distance from W cognitive constraints imposed 
by the superego or reality. Secondary process contribution is minimal because of the sleep 
state, however the pairing of Ok with {ck,} is of a rudimentary secondary process kind. 
An effort is to be made (consciously) to synthesize elements of C into a solution. As 
opposed to dream formation for each ~1~ cognitive attributes cx, are chosen-one or 
several-which are closest to the attributes of W. As with dreams object representatives 
(visual with possibly other sensory modalities) are chosen for the selected elements of C. 
These objects may be regarded as nouns. Lower secondary process capacities link these 
nouns into sentences by combining them through the verbs of W. The resulting sentence(s) 
share cognitive attributes of W as well as verbs used to define W. Call such a sentence 
S. If S shares enough of the cognitive attributes of Wand is linkable sufficiently through 
the verbs of W then S becomes preconscious and is subjected to higher order secondary 
process evaluation. (The sentence S must be capable of sensibly or reasonably carrying 
the affects (IX with intensity comparable to W. Quantification is addressed in a later 
section.) 
Those S’s which become preconscious are reviewed for syntactic integrity in the or- 
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dinary sense of the word. Syntactic insufficiency in one or several S‘s may be resolved 
at this point by merging. This process is the analogue of secondary revision in dreaming. 
(More accurately secondary revision is achieved by the residual of this capacity in the 
sleep state. This capacity is alluded to later as recursive combination though not developed 
at length. See Appendix B.) Let the result of this secondary process review be a potential 
solution S. A reality experiment is conceived to resolve residual ambiguity of S with 
respect to W in a simple way: carry out S, observe the result, and feedback regulate, if 
necessary, modification of S. Such feedback regulation re-enlists the creative mechanism 
as detailed above.* Note that there are two types of feedback: 
i) empirical, deriving from an actual reality test (an experiment), and 
ii) from secondary process evaluation back to primary process synthesis when the 
evaluation of S is placed too far from W or is declared syntactically unacceptable. 
As feedbacks of the above type exhaust elements of C near W the process is continued 
in a relaxed way: elements of C further from W are selected and the degree to which S 
shares cognitive attributes of W is reduced. As these relaxations of constraint are ex- 
hausted the verbs of W used to link the object representatives of C into S are also relaxed: 
cognitive relatives of these verbs which preserve the affectual attributes of the original 
verbs are used to form S. If this too fails W is renounced as irresolvable pro temp and a 
solution awaits the acquisition of more object attribute knowledge. 
This leads to the role of reality (urgency) and superego constraint in the creative pro- 
cess. Urgency has the influence of accelerating the creative process. This is achieved by 
admitting to C elements c~, which are further from the cognitive attributes {ci} of W than 
they would otherwise readily be in the absence of urgency. A second influence in the 
service of accelerating the process is to more readily admit to preconsciousness the re- 
sulting S’s formed by linking object representatives of C through the verbs of W. That 
this increase in speed results in decreased efficiency is seen in the fact that those ck,‘s 
chosen to represent affect al, are not so near the {ci} as they would otherwise be: the 
resulting S’s while sharing attributes of W will tend to be “wider” than necessary in the 
service of expediency. 
(The aphorism “to hunt rabbit with an elephant gun” seems appropriate in describing 
this. It is also, in general, true that these more expedient less efficient solutions are more 
expensive (in the sense of energy rather than wealth) to carry out. Indeed energy is needed 
prior to execution to accelerate that part of the creative process which precedes reality 
testing action. It is also clear that action which is overspecified will require more energy 
(cf., “wider”).) 
Superego constraints degrade the efficiency of the process even more. The superego 
determines defenses against certain affects. If some mx associated with W is repugnant to 
the superego then W will not be fully apprehended by the ego from the outset. The result 
will be that C will be underdefined: critical cognitive attributes cx, will, in general, not be 
admitted. While this may not slow the rate at which S’s are admitted to preconscious- 
ness those which are will not be as comprehensive as they could for want of shared 
(cognitive) attributes: the resulting trial solutions S will be inefficient and less than com- 
prehensive. In the extreme where all affects ah are sufficiently anxiety provoking the 
collection C will fail to be defined and no adaptive action other than a pathological one 
will result. 
* Carrying out the reality test is an ontogenetic heritage ofprojection in healthy development. What is conceived 
within must be materially realizable without. Since this paper discusses the mechanism of creativity rather than 
the relationship of creativity to realization this won’t be addressed further. Suffice it to say that realiration is 
dependent upon a successful ontogenesis of the relation of aggression to projection. 
The creative mechanism: an analytic model 373 
It may be loosely stated that reality (urgency) constraints accelerate the relocation of 
affects al, from {ci} to L.~,‘s while superego constraints decelerate this relocation. Both 
degrade efficiency, the former in the service of objective adaptivity and the latter in 
disservice to objective adaptivity. 
This section has presented a verbal description for a model of the creative mechanism 
as seen in the mature state. This model has components which are identifiable as healthy 
heritages from less mature states in life. The next section will identify these components 
and trace their origins ontogenetically. These components will be prototypes for psychic 
function achieved in the epochs sexual staging: oral, anal, and genital. 
ONTOGENESIS OF CREATIVITY 
If man were defined as a biochemical automaton then it would follow that in its mature 
state this automaton has one consummate function which subsumes all others: to adapt. 
Furthermore since the adaptive loads man encounters are stochastic in nature it also 
follows that adaptivity is identical with creativity. This tautology suggests the position of 
this paper: nature’s purpose in sexual staging is to enable human creativity. 
The sexual stages are oral, anal, and genital: each stage presages a mental development 
appropriate to that stage. Thus orality which sees adaptation negotiated through the oral 
cavity with attendant sexual pleasure is a mental epoch of limited object differentiation. 
The heritage of orality in the mature stage preserves this limited capacity for differentiation 
in a precise way: it enables relocation of affects from a given cognate to other relatively 
less related cognates. This has dramatic adaptive value as suggested previously in outlining 
how essential this relocation is to the creative mechanism. As a generalization it can be 
said that primary process activity is the ontogenetic heir of orality in the healthy mature 
state; it should be noted that it is implicit that the other two sexual stages have also 
healthily matured. (If this were false and only the primary process prevailed (without 
synergistic relatedness to the ontogenetic heirs of anality and genitality) then this would 
define a pure psychosis.) 
If now relocation of affect (as, for example, in present notation, an from the Cj’s of W 
to other c~,‘s not so near W) is regarded as a component or subsystem in creativity then 
it can be said: the relocation component (subsystem) is an ontogenetic heir of orality. 
Furthermore healthy completion of orality establishes for the first time in a human’s life 
a psychic prototype for this relocation component (subsystem). 
Relocation of affect is essential to creativity in the conceptual sense as outlined here. 
However in the real action situation of responding it has further adaptive value: the 
(healthy) action residue of orality with its limited differentiation powers is to allocate small 
quantities of like affectual energy to all known objects which normally carry that affect 
in response. That is, orality enables a tentative preparation for final adaptive action by 
allocating energy to many possibilities. As the creative mechanism progresses the adaptive 
load is more appropriately identified and energy is concentrated over a smaller class of 
objects and their potential outcomes in the reality testing phase of creativity. 
Construction of the set C involves many decisions of a clearly logical and mathematical 
character. In addition synthesis of trial solutions 5’ also enlists powers of a like kind. 
Clearly that portion of the creative mechanism which lies between the relocation sub- 
system and reality testing is characterizable as secondary process activity. As relocation 
is the mental outcome of orality so is logical negation and its logical consequences the 
mental outcome of anality. The logical consequences of negation are essentially object 
discrimination (the capacity to perceive that x # y) and reality testing (the capacity to 
test if x = y or not). These capacities may be characterized as identifying capacities. 
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Without making an excursion into logic and mathematics it can be said that the capacity 
to construct C and tentative solutions S is an identification component (subsystem) in 
creativity. In the mechanism of creativity the identification subsystem is the ontogenetic 
heir of anality and is first established as a psychic prototype at the healthy completion 
of this stage. (Suffice it to say the decision x # 4’ cannot be made without negation. The 
decisions involved in the phase of creativity referred to are either of this type or derived 
from decisions of this type together with relocation.) 
The above may be collected together compactly as: primary process activity which is 
characterized by relocation is the healthy ontogenetic heir of orality in creativity: sec- 
ondary process activity which is characterized by identification is the healthy ontogenetic 
heir of anality[ I61 in creativity. 
The motor ontogenetic heir of orality was presented briefly on page 372. The motor 
(action/implementation oriented) heir of anality is concentration of aggression as well as 
enhancement (quantitative intensification) of aggressive energy. Energy is used here as 
elsewhere in the sense of physics: the capacity to perform work. Hence the conce$ual 
and motor heirs are isomorphic with relocation corresponding to energy distribution over 
possibilities and identification corresponding to concentration of energy. Note that con- 
centration as implied here would be achieved in part by collecting together those energies 
allocated tentatively over sundry possibilities. This isomorphism suggests a known par- 
adigm: orality and anality have an inverse logical relationship to each other; and this 
relation prevails at both the formulation and motor levels. 
The oral and anal stages achieve psychic prototypes for that part of the creative 
mechanism that precedes a reality experiment. As hinted at the final phase of creativity 
is established as a psychic prototype at the genital stage. The first two prototypes (sub- 
systems) are preparatory in nature and relate to the adaptive wish W passively. That is, 
the first two prototypes respond to the presentation of W as perceived. The final stage 
of creativity reverses the direction of action. The first two phases respond to the object 
W; the final phase sees W, as it were, respond to the creative action. 
This paper does not address the relation of stage appropriate sexuality to stage appro- 
priate mentality. If however one equates mentality with ego and sexuality with id then 
Freud’s original model of id preceding ego with ego cortical to id is relevant. As for the 
creative response itself the implication is a weighted presence of distinctly oral, anal, and 
genital sexual pleasures (even though the first two are subsumed by the third in the healthy 
adult state) in creativity, the weights determined by the degree to which the three sub- 
system prototypes are enlisted in appropriate adaptive response. A full resolution of this 
relationship (mentality to sexuality) is still pending. The significant model for this relation 
is that of an object-as the mother in the oral epoch-presented to the infant’s sexuality 
so as to affectively cue the infant’s response. This response which is indeed affcctual and 
presumably healthily cued is so to speak a unit element in achieving (ontogenetically) a 
total psychic structure. That is, the appropriate presentation of objects to infantile sexuality 
defines through the infant’s successive responses an increasingly appropriate and adap- 
tive mental organization. Psychic structure is essentially the accumulation of growing 
capacities for both sexual and mental response. Clearly an input/output systems concept 
could model this evolutionary process. 
The final phase of carrying out a reality experiment to determine the efficacy of a trial 
solution S is an effort to modify reality in favor of a wish: the wish to successfully resolve 
W. The first instance of a wish to secure an object by modifying reality takes place in 
the genital stage of life; the totality of circumstances (heterosexual attraction to a parent 
+ homosexual rivalry) is the Oedipus complex. This may be tersely stated with the par- 
adigm: at the Oedipal stage of development, in the guise of tenderly securing the parent 
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of the opposite sex, a psychic prototype for creativity is achieved. The first object (which, 
so to say, exercises the creative mechanism) of creativity is the Oedipal object. This has 
obvious consequences for pathology. 
The Oedipal prototype of creativity establishes outward object relatedness and achieves 
three things organizationally. First it synergistically marries the oral and anal prototypes 
in pursuit of the object W. Prior to the completion of this stage these two prototypes are 
not so clearly related and indeed enjoy some independence of existence (as is observable 
in some forms of schizophrenia). Secondly the reality testing powers and the aggressions 
of anality are brought into synergistic service of object pursuit. Thirdly a psychic prototype 
for creativity as an input/output system is achieved in which this system is driven by the 
object libido associated with W. That is, if object libido of W is input to the creative 
mechanism then the resulting output is eventually reality modifying action in favor of W. 
(At times, alas, immediate action is impossible and action awaits the acquisition of more 
information on W or on objects needed to resolve W.) The third organizational conse- 
quence of genitality allows the formulation: creativity = primary process (relocation = 
orality) + secondary process (identification = anality) + trial action (object relatedness 
= genitality). 
Thus the creative mechanism has three subsystems which are established as prototypes 
in the three corresponding stages of sexual development. These are relocation (orality), 
identification (anality), and object relatedness (genitality + Oedipus situation). The syn- 
ergistic relatedness of relocation and identification to the mechanism is subsumed in the 
establishment of object relatedness. Thus the Oedipal epoch as a final (organizational) 
flowering of sexuality results in the consummate life power of the mechanism of creativity 
(= adaptivity). This clearly and dramatically illustrates the significance of Freud’s concept 
of sexuality as tendency to survive. 
This sketch of the ontogenesis of creativity suggests an alternative and somewhat pos- 
itive view of pathology. The next section will develop the notion of pathology as being 
initiated by defense against conflict but resulting in certain defects in the creative mech- 
anism. 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND CREATIVITY 
The analytic model for full healthy development of personality requires adequate com- 
pletion sequentially of each of the three sexual stages oral, anal, and genital. Insufficient 
achievement at any of these stages presages at best predisposition to later illness (psy- 
chopathology) and more generally indicates illness at the time of the given stage although 
differentiation of symptoms from age adequate behavior may be difficult. Retracing de- 
velopment backwards from the genital stage to the oral stage implies three different kinds 
of failure in establishing (fully) the mechanism of creativity. Thus healthy organization 
of the personality is equatable with commensurate fficacy of the mechanism of creativity. 
If defense against conflict begins at the genital stage with satisfactory development 
previously then the major mode of defense will be repression. This has two consequences 
on establishing a fully mature mechanism of creativity. First the child’s initial attempt at 
reality modification (Oedipus complex) having been unsuccessful, the child will later ex- 
perience inhibited object relatedness to adaptive demands which later exercise the Oedipal 
prototype. This immediately implies a limitation of healthy aggression in the sphere of 
action when testing trial solutions S of the form previously referred to. Hence perception 
of the adaptive demand W will be with insufficient libido and therefore the affects {(I~} of 
W will be underdefined. (Were libido sufficient then necessarily appropriate aggression 
as an anaclitic concomittant would also be-which it isn’t in this context.) Secondly the 
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repression in limiting motor access to successful action also limits the access of forbidden 
affects to appropriate memories of objects. This implies that the set C will be underdefined 
because in this case the association Of an affect ill, with Certain (appropriate) ch,‘s iS 
precluded through repression. 
The pure case of genital failure through repression therefore limits creativity by 
i) underdefining the affects of W because of inhibited aggressive and therefore libidinal 
response and 
ii) underdefining C because repression precludes certain otherwise normal affect/cog- 
nate pairings. One can say failure at genitality implies failure of creative action with 
modest failure of creative conceptualization because the primary and secondary 
processes are intact and essentially enjoy a synergistic relatedness in subordination 
to the creative mechanism: Oedipal object relatedness was successful enough to 
almost complete the formulation prototype although trial action has miscarried some- 
what into repression. 
If the anal stage has not been adequately negotiated then Oedipal difficulty may begin 
with efforts at repression which are either immature or inadequate and result in repression 
with regression. That is, the child not having matured to adequate organization for repres- 
sion (an age appropriate capacity derived from prior anality) will be driven to renounce 
its tentative advance in psychic organization in favor of a prior one more solidly defined 
(less tentative). In this case object relatedness is poorer than previously, the degradation 
in defining Wand C is worse, the reality testing powers are less mature. and the synergistic 
relation of primary and secondary process is not complete. Symptomatically besides ag- 
gravation of the creative state as seen in repression there is also failure in (secondary 
process) capacity to synthesize trial solutions S and to formulate reality experiments. 
Large scale segregation of affects from memories of objects together with immature reality 
testing powers sees creative formulatons somewhat dominated by primary process syntax 
with profound inhibition of creative action: the child has not only given up some of its 
aggressive and hence libidinal relatedness to objects but has also renounced to some degree 
the mental precedessors of such relatedness. The creative mechanism here sees mature 
primary process contribution with immature secondary process contribution and coor- 
dination, and little of mature trial action. 
The above remarks belabor the clear correspondence between incidence of pathology 
and failure at creativity at the late anal and genital stages. The identity pathology = failure 
at creativity can be presented more clearly by itemizing the three classes of pathology: 
i) maturity (oral and anal) at genitality with repression; 
ii) immature genitality with repression followed by regression; 
iii) fixation, partial or complete, at a stage. 
(Note that ii) may result from iii) because fixations at the anal stage may enable only 
a weak Oedipal organization at the genital stage so that anal aggression failing to mature 
to repressive capacity miscarries repression and a renunciation of Oedipal organization 
follows: in essence only the last healthy stage survives the dissolution of progress in 
psychic organization. This loss (or abandonment) of organization is regression. Similar 
results apply to regression back to oral fixations.) 
Cases i) and ii) have been presented. The third case is the most severe. If fixation at 
a stage is partial then some degree of Oedipal organization will be achieved. Whether the 
fixations are oral. anal, or both this implies poor object relatedness, inhibition or mis- 
direction of aggression, poor reality testing, dominance of C and S formulation by primary 
process mechanisms, and some isolation or independence of primary from secondary 
process. If partial fixation approaches complete fixation then an Oedipal organization is 
essentially precluded. This implies little resemblance in psychic organization to the mech- 
anism of creativity and a profound lack of relation of action to conceptualization. It should 
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Fig. I. The relation of time and sexual staging to forming the creative mechanism. 0 = Oral. A = Anal. G = 
Genital. f = formulation. a = action. 
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Fig. 2. The correspondence between stage appropriate pathologies and implied failures at creativity. 0 = Oral. 
A = Anal, G = Genital, f = formulation. a = action. 
be noted that pathology as defense against conflict obtains from the late anal stage to the 
genital. Earlier pathologies also arise from defense but against unmanagable xcitation. 
Let 0, A, and G denote the oral, anal, and genital stages. The full mechanism of 
creativity has a formulation aspect and an action aspect. Figure 1 depicts the time/sexual 
stage relation to the formation of the creative mechanism. This simplified diagram illus- 
trates how nature has formatted ontogenesis so that formulation prototypes precede action 
prototypes in the mechanism: guiding intelligence must pre-exist before capacity for action 
evolves. 
Figure 2 is a visual guide to the correspondence between pathology and implied failure 
at creativity. Admittedly more could be said about the implied identity pathology = failure 
at creativity but the concepts appear transparent enough to omit further elaboration. 
Suffice it to say that pathology studies the immediate causes of the morbid condition itself 
while the present paper details the implied failures at adaptivity which result from on- 
togenesis conditioned by the morbid process. Hopefully what ambiguities have surrounded 
the presentation thus far of an ideal creative mechanism will be resolved in the next section 
on modelling. 
A SYMBOLIC MODEL FOR THE MECHANISM OF CREATIVITY 
An algorithm for simulating the creative mechanism (at the formulation level) is presented 
below. It uses the notation dA for distance between affects and d,. for distance between 
cognates. The term syntactic integrity referred to previously is also used. The construction 
of dA and dc, and definition of syntactic integrity are given in Appendix B: presenting 
them here would involve a digression large enough to obscure the mode1 below. The 
model is presented as a sequence of steps which define an algorithm. 
1. Define the affectual attributes (affects) {uX} of W; define the cognitive attributes (de- 
scriptive phrase; cognates) {c:j} of W; define parameters p, S/7, E, SE, and q whose 
significance is made clear below. 
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Associate with each affect ax of W the set {c~,} of cognates that carry affect rnA in 
response. (It is assumed that the c~,‘s are those known to the subject in question and 
that the subject’s response to c’~, includes affect Us.) 
For each k and each 1 choose that c~, for which dc(ck,, cI) is minimal (if there is more 
than one such ck, admit them one at a time). Call the resulting set of L.~,‘s C, 
i.e., C = U {cc}. 
Let 0 denote the set of objects whose cognitive attributes include at least loop% of 
C. (Recall that an object is defined to be a cognitive attribute list.) Go to 5. If no such 
object exists then repeat 3 with a one-at-a-time relaxed minimization: for each 1 choose 
the first runner-up for min d&CL,, cl), followed by the second, etc. If this fails then 
relax two-at-a-time, etc. If all these fail to define 0 then redefine p as p - Sp and 
repeat 3 as before. If this fails redefine p as p - 26~ and continue until 0 is defined 
or p becomes <O. If all efforts produce no 0 or if p < 0 then no solution exists pro 
temp. When 0 is defined go to 5. 
Let ol, o2 E 0 and 11 be a verb of W. Form sentences S of the form ol 1’ 02; that is, 
trial solutions are formed by linking objects of 0 through verbs of W. 
Let S = ol 7~ oZ have associated affects {a,:,,} then define dA(S,W) = ?‘j“” d,,(u,:,, ah), 
the affectual distance from S to W. (Decision 6(i) precedes 6(ii) because 6(i) is affectual 
while 6(ii) is cognitive and affectual decisions are made more rapidly than cognitive. 
The affectual response precedes the cognitive response temporally.) 
(i) S must satisfy &(S, W) < E;? that is, S must be reasonably affectually like W, as 
one would expect a trial solution to be. If this fails for all such S’s then relax 
dA(S, W) by omitting affects ux one-at-a-time as in 4 with cognates. Should this 
fail for all S’s relax two-at-a-time, etc. in the definition of dA(S,W). If all these 
fail redefine E as E - 8~ and repeat 5 as before. If all these fail for the redefined 
E’S until E < 0 then replace the verbs {-il,,} of W by verbs {v:~} where dA($,, P,,) 
< q. If there is more than one XI:, for which &(I’:, ZI,,) < q choose the first; if 
both have the same distance from I),, choose the first. Go to 5. If no such ZJ;,‘s 
exist then no solution exists pro temp. 
(ii) S must have syntactic integrity. If no S satisfies this then redefine S as in 6(i). If 
this fails then no solution exists pro temp. 
Reality test S by carrying out the verbs of S. Call the result R. If all the affects and 
cognates of Ware among those of R then W is resolved completely, otherwise success 
is partial. If partial then iterate from step 1 onward with augmented or modified def- 
initions of {ali} and {cj} as determined by the feedback of the reality test. (The reality 
test not only is an experiment to observe the efficacy of S in resolving W: it is also 
an occasion to learn more about W and even to augment the subject’s repertoire of 
affect, cognate, and object knowledge. The result could be to expand {c:i} and/or {uk} 
(augment) or to otherwise change {cj} and/or {ak} (modify). Strictly speaking for R to 
resolve W then the affects of R would have to have intensities comparable to or greater 
than those of W. This paper does not address quantifying affect and so this aspect of 
the model remains a generalization to be accommodated elsewhere. The issue of 
quantifying affect is addressed in detail in Badalamenti.) It may be advisable for 
simulation to have a fixed number N of iterations prior to declaring W irresolvable 
pro temp. 
Steps l-7 are an algorithm for simulating the creative mechanism in the mature state. 
A suitable choice for E might be 2 r:)‘” d,, (~1~. (1,) which corresponds intuitively to a diameter of W. Roughly 
this says that S should be not further affectually from W than twice the two most distant affects of Ware from 
each other. S can be visualized as lying within a natural diameter’s distance of W. 
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Steps 2 + 3 correspond to oral relocation (primary process); step 4 and to some degree 
5 correspond to anal identification (secondary process); step 6 (and step 5 in part) cor- 
respond to higher secondary process (identification) functions; step 6 also reflects through 
review of verbs the object relatedness of the genital stage; step 7 reflects the heritages 
of the late anal and of the genital stages in its emphasis on action tempered by judgment. 
This model can be constrained to accommodate reality constraints (urgency), or psy- 
chopathological constraints (superego, or insufficient maturation), or ontogenesis. The 
most ordinary reality constraint is that of a known object x E 0 having loop% of the 
attributes of C but not being available. More generally let it be the case that there are no 
available objects carrying attribute L’h, of C. Then set dc(cx,,cl) = x. (Of course lack of 
availability of x may be resolved by the secondary wish W’ to obtain or approximate x. 
This is not the algorithmic step taken here although it is easily incorporated into the present 
model.) However, urgency in the real sense means that W must be resolved quickly. The 
price of speed will of course be inefficiency as well as more energy in formulation and/ 
or execution than would otherwise prevail. Step 4 can readily be relaxed for results by 
making p smaller which has the effect of allowing some objects of 0 to be further from W. 
Similarly if E is increased in step 6(i) then some trial solutions S will be admitted which 
are not so affectually near Was previously. The review of syntactic integrity 6(ii) cannot 
be relaxed especially when steps 4 and 6(i) have been. The resulting actions of step 7 will 
tend to be overdetermined and hence inefficient as a result of increased cognitive and 
affectual distance from W. Finally if N is implemented in step 7 (number of iterations) 
then urgency favors setting N = x. A more faithful representation of urgency’s influence 
would feature a joint functional relatedness of all the parameters perturbed in magnitude 
by urgency. This would be an interesting study in its own right. 
The most observable influence of pathology in creativity is in inhibiting appropriate 
action. Less observable but more representable in the present context is the regressive 
inhibition of formulation as antecedent to action. Any pathology features lack of matur- 
ational completion in one or several of the three stages oral, anal, and genital with in- 
completeness at one of the first two implying necessary incompleteness at the corre- 
sponding later stages. Rather than proceeding by giving an isomorphism from pathology 
type to stage(s) incompleteness it will be more efficient to outline the influence of each 
stage’s incompleteness on the algorithm; simulating a pathology’s influence on creative 
formulation is then reduced to the detail of constructing the appropriate isomorphism from 
pathology to degree and type of stage completion for each stage. 
A mental hallmark of genital incompleteness is a too severe and/or extensive superego. 
This is reflected by certain affects oh of W being prohibited access to consciousness. This 
prohibition is reflected in step 3 by setting &(ch,,cl) = x for those (‘h, that carry affect 
ah too strongly. (As stated previously this paper doesn’t address quantifying affect. Yet 
the quantification exists and is feasible; the meaning of too strongly would translate into 
a parameter.) This in turn influences 6(i) because 5’ will tend not to have certain affects 
of W; the influence on steps 4 and 5 is clear and is therefore omitted. (Actually one can 
say that under these circumstances the affects of S move away from W: those present 
may be nearer or further from W than without the condition dc(cx,, cl) = cc. The best 
that can be predicted is a lower likelihood of dA(S, W) < E forecasting affectual affinity 
between S and Win a comprehensive sense. This is clearly a degradation in the efficiency 
of the algorithm as would be expected.) The relatedness to step 7 is recursive in that if 
prohibited affects (and hence cognates) are present in R then the preceding remarks of 
this paragraph again obtain. To a meager degree the diminished appropriate motor capacity 
which characterizes genital failure is representable through the use of N in step 7: small 
values represent this. More generally all of the above (except N in step 7) can be made 
more faithful to reality if grades of superego constraint are recognized. That is, rather 
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than setting &(cs, , L’ I1 = x set dc(cx,, c I ) = a for some large u depending on ch, and W. 
This would propagate through steps 3-6 as indicated previously. 
Loosely speaking the last paragraph states that genital failures limit creative formulation 
by keeping those cognates that carry proscribed affects from entering (strongly) into for- 
mulation. This is of course the translate of superego driven repression. Correspondingly 
anal failures will reflect the influence of fixation or regression on reality testing as well 
as on the degree of implied genital failure. Tracing the step modifications backward from 
7 to 4 will correspond temporally to more severe fixations or regressions. A judgmental 
failure related to the mental representation of action in the anal stage is in the definitions 
of verbs. In 6(ii) the review for syntactic integrity assumes that the given verbs are properly 
defined as transformations of affect. Since maturity corresponds in this context to dif- 
ferentiating capacity the deficiency may be represented by overdefining the domains and 
ranges of a verb. That is the domain 0~ of ZJ is augmented to include affects uI for which 
dA(a,, On) < (Y for some parameter (Y whose magnitude reflects degree of stage incom- 
pleteness; similar remarks apply to 0 K. This will have the effect of declaring S to have 
syntactic integrity when in reality it may not. 
Poor affectual differentiation also characterizes anal developments. Indeed obsession- 
als are noted for confounding affects related to tenderness versus aggression. (The ob- 
sessional disorder is characterized by anal regression.) This situation is representable by 
setting &(uI,, Us) = 0 for such confounded affects. This of course influences the decision 
in 6(i) (d.+,(S, W) < E) and will in general put inappropriate S’s near W because their affects 
are confounded with those of W (rather than logically near them). Objects in OD or OR 
are defined by their affects, i. e., x E On because it carries affects to a sufficient degree 
which define the domain of the given verb U. The influence of affectual confounding is 
felt here too where an object x which carries an affect confounded with one of the domain 
of 11 is declared to belong to OD (when in fact it may fail to logically carry any appropriate 
domain affect to a sufficient degree). This means that the formulation of S in step 5 will 
feature inappropriate forms ol 11 o Z for such objects ol and 02; furthermore the above 
remarks imply that such an S will pass the test for syntactic integrity and may be declared 
to satisfy dA(S, W) < E. Finally if anal regression is quite severe then basic critical mental 
powers may fail to develop. Such a mental power is the decision that an object x has at 
least loop% of attributes of C. This is modellable with replacement of p by the hp where 
0 < h < I and h reflects the degree of regression. 
The influence of anal failure on genital incompleteness is reflectable by the choice of 
larger u’s in step 3 (as suggested two paragraphs above) as well as by diminished N’s in 
step 7. 
Thus far the repressive influence of genital failure and the judgmental (affectual and 
cognitive) inadequacies implied by anal failure have been accommodated by the model. 
The outcome of oral incompleteness is a more profound immaturity in affect/cognate 
pairing as well as (implied) failures at maturity in the anal and genital stages whose suc- 
cessful outcomes prerequire the successful completion(s) of the stage(s) preceding them. 
Steps 1, 2, and 3 will be modified to account for oral fixations and/or regressions with 
step I modifications corresponding to more severe pathology than step 2, and step 2 more 
severe than step 3. As an epoch in psychic development he oral stage sees the emergence 
of the first mentality of the organism from its (prior) first sexuality. Oral mentality is 
characterized by limited differentiation both affectively and cognitively; indeed affectual 
differentiation necessarily precedes cognitive differentiation. This is reflected in the oral 
(primary process) tendency to regard as identical any two objects that share an affectual 
attribute to a sufficient degree. That is, given an affect ah then any two cognates ci, and 
ci, are regarded as identical if both c:j, and ci, carry affect a~ sufficiently in response. Model 
this by setting dc(ci,, ciz) = 0. 
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The last statement implies that in step 3 large classes of cognates cx will ail be at minimal 
distance from W. In step 2 this means that the set {cx,} of cognates that carry affect ax 
will be larger than otherwise and that any two set of cognates {cx,} and {CL,} may coincide. 
Affects at the oral stage are not well differentiated. This implies that in step I the set {a~} 
will be reduced to a smaller set of affects {u;} where each cr; corresponds to one or more 
ax’s (the mapping from {af} to {ax} is i-to-many). This clearly alters the definitions of 
verbs 71 which are defined as transformations on classes of affect: in fact this will tend to 
make verbs look alike. Thus lack of affectuai differentiation implies not merely reduced 
cognitive differentiation but also diminished separation of verbs as seen in step 5. Similarly 
the declaration in 6(i) dA(S, W) < E will be made more easily than previously for reasons 
of coarse differentiation; the review for syntactic integrity 6(ii) has been alluded to. 
As previously the only representation of this stage’s incompleteness in action in this 
model is in step 7 where N may again be reduced; indeed it may fail to be reached for 
lack of formulation. That is, the low differentiating powers implied will either produce 
no 5’ or will redundantly produce the same S’s. The influence of oral pathology on other 
stages translates as exacerbation of those algorithmic decisions that represent those later 
capacities which pre-require oral completion. This will tend to happen naturally-except 
for step 7-because reduction of {nx} and {c.j} propagates logically into every step of the 
algorithm. 
Representing ontogenesis is now a formality. As Freud often indicated neurosis and 
psychosis may be regarded as studies in infantile sexuality or ego development respec- 
tively. Ontogenetic representation would essentially mean retracing pathological repre- 
sentations backwards from oral to genital. The sole addition would be modeiiing growth 
of memory by adding more known attributes (~1~‘s or c,‘s) at each stage or at the completion 
of each W as illustrated below. (Note that when step 1 identifies attributes {an} and {ci} 
it identifies not those of W but those of W that are recognizable to the subject. It has 
been implicit that the “memory” of attributes for the subject has been appropriately 
defined with respect to age, sex, intelligence, etc.) 
The illustration to follow will hopefully clarify the structure and mechanics of this 
algorithm. It is a simple illustration with the merit of converging rapidly to a solution S. 
Hopefully this gain in clarity will compensate for its compromise with reality. 
Consider a child in a playpen. Outside the pen beyond its reach is an object in wishes 
to fetch. In the pen are a bail, a bottle, and a stick. For simplicity let the set of known 
objects (to the child) be ball, bottle, stick, hand, and arm. (The algorithm would quickly 
reject most other objects.) For this problem W = to reach and grasp the object. W has 
cognitive attributes C’I = length, (‘z = grasp, c’~ = shape, and affectuai attributes cl1 = 
mastery, uz = curiosity, and a3 = satisfaction. Here each ml, (k = I, 2, 3) is associated 
with ail the attributes ci u = I, 2, 3) which corespond here to the cx,‘s. Table I itemizes 
how the ci’s are associated with objects known to the child. Note that only W has ail 
attributes cl, cl, and (‘3. Table 2 summarizes the relative proximities of the ci’s and Table 
Table I. Cognitive attributes of known objects t(.,‘s) and of W 
Note that W also refers to the unknown object. Since W is a 
wish it is not regarded as a known ob_ject. 
Length Grasp Shape 
Ball 
Bottle 
Stick 
Hand 
Arm 
W (object) 
N N Y 
N N Y 
Y N Y 
N Y Y 
Y N N 
Y Y Y 
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Table 2. Distance between cognitive attributes (&) 
Length Grasp Shape 
Length 0 2 I 
Grasp 2 0 I 
Shape I I 0 
3 summarizes the relative proximities of the aL’s. Recall that these distances are ordinal 
and reflect degree of relatedness rather than absolute distance so that mastery is more 
related to satisfaction than curiosity in Table 3. 
Begin the algorithm with p = .8, Sp = .l, E 4, SE = 3, +q = 3, N = 5, and bear in 
mind that arm, hand, and stick are obviously the objects in the solution; note that the 
values of SE, -I-) and N will prove unnecessary in the solution. This is the natural E of page 
378 2 r:“” dA(ax, U,j). Paragraphs A-D below exhibit the iterations of the algorithm. 
A. min dc(cc, cl) = 0, corresponding to length, 
min dc(ck,, cz) = 0, corresponding to grasp, 
min &(c~,, c.~) = 0, corresponding to shape; only W has loop% of these attributes and W 
is not a known object. 
B. Relax the minimization one at a time; 
(cl relaxed) cbtain c), c2, c3 or c2, c2, c3 = grasp, shape; only hand has loop% of these 
attributes. 
(c2 relaxed) obtain cl , c3, c3 or cl , c, , c3 = length, shape; this yields stick. 
(c3 relaxed) obtain cl, c2, cl or cl, c2, c2 = length, grasp; this corresponds to no known 
object. 
C. Relax the minimization two at a time; 
(cr , c2 relaxed) obtain c3, c3, cl = length, shape; this yields stick; also obtain c3, c3, c2 
= grasp, shape; this yields hand; also obtain c2, c3, cl and c2, c3, c2 which are listed 
above. 
(cl, c3 relaxed) obtain c3, c3, cl as above; also c3, c3, c2 as above; also c2, c?, cl as above; 
and c’~, c2, c1 which yields hand. 
(c2, c3 relaxed) obtain cl, c3, cl as above; also cl, c3, c2 as above; also cl, cl, cl which 
yields arm, stick; also cl, cl, c2 as above. 
D. Relax the minimization three at a time to obtain the following triples all of which 
repeat above triples: 
c2, (‘I, cl; c2, (‘I, (‘2; c2. c3, cl; c2, c’3, L’2; L’3, Cl, cl; c3, Cl, c2; c3, c3, cl; (‘3, c3, c2. 
If p changes none of the above changes till p = .6. However it is not until p = .5 and c‘~ 
is relaxed in the minimization that we obtain as attributes cl, cz, and cl or length and 
grasp. The known objects having loop% of these attributes are stick, hand and arm. The 
verbs of W are reach and grasp which may be used to link the known objects as: arm 
reach (stick); hand grasp (stick): (stick) reach object; (stick) grasp (object). Here S is 
formed by recursively combining sentences S of the form ol 11 02. Here dA(S, W) = 2 < 
4 where now S refers to the combined sentence; hence 6(i) is satisfied. 
Table 3. Distance between affectual attributes (do) 
Mastery Satisfaction Curiosity 
Mastery 
Satisfaction 
Curiosity 
0 I 2 
I 0 I 
2 I 0 
The creative mechanism: an analytic model 3x3 
Table 4. The verbs reach and grasp transform the above 
domain affects (with representing objects 0,)) into the above 
range affects (with the representing objects 0~). 
Objects 
01) 
Hand 
Arm 
Stick 
Hand 
Stick 
Bottle 
Ball 
Domain 
affects 
Mastery 
Curiosity 
Mastery 
Satisfaction 
Verb 
Reach 
Grasp 
Range 
affects 
Mastery 
Satisfaction 
Mastery 
Satisfaction 
Curiosity 
Objects 
OR 
Stick 
Bottle 
Object 
Hand 
Stick 
Bottle 
Ball 
Object 
An apology for combining in the illustration when the algorithm assumes none: as noted 
in Appendix B it is not difficult to present an algorithm for recursive combining of primitive 
S’s (0, 7) 02) and furthermore since the algorithm already furnishes stick, hand, and arm 
it seems appropriate to link them through combining. The purpose of the illustration is 
to exhibit explicitly some of the algorithm’s iterations. 
Reference to Table 4 reveals that each subsentence (0, 71 02) has syntactic integrity 
and that the combined sentence also has syntactic integrity. This completes the formu- 
lation of S and the illustration. 
If the example were real then after adaptation the object stick would have associated 
with it the cognitive attribute grasp as well as all affects which are associated with grasp. 
This illustrates the modification of memory in ontogenetic simulation referred to previ- 
ously. Note that in this illustration stick already carries all known affects a, 1 u2, and N~ 
although stick did not at the outset carry the cognate grasp. 
SUMMARY 
This paper has presented the concept of sexual staging leading to a mature organism 
whose consummate adaptive capacity in negotiating reality is the mechanism of creativity. 
Each stage presents a different capacity: oral yielding relocation of affect capacities which 
expedite mobilization and ideational processing; anal which yield reality testing powers 
(identification) as well as aggressive powers needed for mastery and later object pursuit; 
and genital yielding via object relatedness a synthesis of prior stages subject to goal of 
object attainment. 
An algorithm for representing as well as simulating this mechanism was presented which 
seeks to capture the spirit with which the mechanism operates. It has certain clear de- 
ficiences which are in part intentional: the weaknesses of the algorithm tend to be omis- 
sions of those representing techniques that are currently well explored. For example the 
construction of trial solutions S could be sharpened to accommodate the most general 
sentence S; this is an interesting however already explored problem. The secondary pro- 
cess review of S in step 7 (reality testing experiment) which features action and feedback 
is also an interesting and desirable accommodation which would make the algorithm more 
faithful to reality. (There is perhaps more representation of this in the present model than 
is at first apparent. That is, in true creative work one first asks if S can work prior to 
action. This question is implicit in the present model in step 6.) However, representing 
such a capacity in an algorithmic form is at this time a rather standard problem in systems 
science. The philosophy taken here has been to present enough of an algorithm to be 
faithful to the mechanism itself and to leave elaborations-especially of well explored 
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cognitive functions-as a desirable addition which should be added at a later time: iden- 
tifying the mechanism psychologically and giving it wholistic system representation has 
been the objective here. 
The influence of later life developments, notably latency, puberty, adolescence and 
early adulthood has not been presented. Their influence in “fine tuning” and/or stressing 
the mechanism seem apparent enough to warrant omission. Also the distinction between 
male and female has been untreated because such differences (where they exist) are rep- 
resentable in the given algorithm in the way known affects ax and cognates c’j are defined 
for the subject to be simulated. The mechanism of creativity appears to be structurally 
identical in both sexes with sexual distinction manifesting itself in the way objects of the 
mechanism are defined affectually and cognitively. 
Finally the major shortcoming of this paper has been the lack of treatment of the action 
component of creativity. It seems appropriate however to first treat formulation which is 
the precursor to action: Freud often referred to thought as experimental action. 
APPENDIX A: PSYCHOANALYTIC DEFINITIONS 
Affect: this is best defined as the state of the psyche at any given time; it is more general 
than emotion-with which it tends to be confused-which is a part of the total state. 
Affectual states refer to the biological (instinctual) processes through the emotional to the 
cognitive processes. 
Aggression: the capacity to modify reality whether internal or external. It pertains 
especially to judgmentally moderated motor action in the healthy and to cruel (sadistic) 
superego formations in the pathological which see the aggressions in abortive service of 
the superego. 
Anal stage: the second stage of human sexuality marked by the emergence of erotic 
sensation in the anal canal especially the mucosa. Mentality pertaining to reality testing 
and aggressive tendencies serving later mastery derive in healthy development from anal 
sexuality. 
Cognition: the human capacity to construct and store mental representations of objects 
and to perform arithmetic, logical and judgmental decisions on them. 
Genital stage: the third and final stage of human sexuality characterized by the con- 
fluence of prior (pre-genital) oral and anal sexual tendencies in subordination to genital 
sexuality. The sexuality of this epoch derives into the mentality of (mature) object choice 
and pursuit. Indeed the outcome of the genital stage is the mechanism of creativity sculp- 
tured by a primal (genital driven) heterosexual object choice. With the advent of this stage 
prior pre-genital tendencies (ideally) lose their autonomy. 
Instinct: a precursor of psychic structure (and hence behavior) of the highest level of 
generality. An instinct is a highly general tendency of either a sexual or aggressive nature- 
not necessarily an impulse-favoring a direction for the emergence of mentality or other 
psychic organization. The Freudian model sees mentality and motor capacity as derivates 
of primitive sexuality or aggressivity. The attributes of such structure defining sexuality 
or aggressivity are themselves best defined as instincts. 
Libido: from the Latin (without change) for lust. Libido is the energy associated with 
sexuality. Energy is here defined in the sense of physics: the capacity to perform work 
( = reality modification). 
Oedipal complex: the behavioral outcome of the genital stage where the child makes 
its first effort at success (= triumph) in heterosexual parental object choice in the presence 
of homosexual parental interference. The process is driven by genital sexuality and is 
intended,in nature’s format to mature the interrelations of pregenital strivings together 
with genitality into creativity. 
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Oral stuge: the first (neonatal) sexual stage of life characterized by erotic sensation in 
the oral cavity especially the mucosa. From the seed of oral sexuality derives the mentality 
of affectual relocability. Its healthy ontogenetic heir is the highly associative primary 
process as seen in dreaming. 
Preconscious: a state of the memory of a known object such that the memory is not 
conscious but either will be conscious or could be conscious. 
Primary process: the mental outcome of oral sexuality. These psychic processes (mostly 
unconscious) are characterized by relocation of affect, i.e., two objects x and y with x f 
y are regarded as equal if they share a common affect to a sufficient degree. Freud labelled 
the laws of relocation as distortion, displacement and condensation. Primary process 
activity is seen in dreams and in the waking behavior of psychotics. 
Reality: that which is either sensed by the sensorium or that which can stimulate the 
sensorium. This implies that object representations are real to the subject but not that 
they are faithful (fully) to the original real objects of which they are psychic copies or 
psychic constructs. 
Secondary process: the psychic outcome of anal sexuality (and in part genital sexuality) 
characterized by logical and reality testing powers. 
Sexuality: the impulsion to survive whether in the individual or collective (species) 
sense. Genital sexuality is a small subset of sexuality in this framework. 
Superego: a psychic construct which can punish via guilt (and hence anxiety) or reward 
via esteem (and hence euphoria). It is derived from the internalization of parental or 
familial do-don’t values driven by the child’s fear of loss of love. 
APPENDIX B: DEFINING DISTANCE AND SYNTACTIC INTEGRITY 
The distance functions dA and de 
Let cl and c2 be cognates, then dc(cl, c2) is defined to be a number, called cognitive 
distance, that measures the relatedness of cl to c 2. Similarly if ai and a2 are affects then 
dA (a,, u2) is a number, called affective distance, that measures the relatedness of aI to 
uz. The distances dA and dc are ordinal: if d&x, y) < d&x, z) then x is more cognitively 
related to y than z. In other words absolute numerical magnitude is inconsequential but 
relative magnitude is; likewise for da. For example if d&tall, short) = 1 then one would 
expect d&tall, idea) > I because tall and short are more cognitively related than tall and 
idea. 
For the purposes of modelling it suffices to note that the existence of dA and dc are 
implied by the human capacity for differential response both cognitively and affectually. 
The author knows of no explicit formulations of dC over a set of cognates or of dA over 
a set of affects. However association experiments and differential response experiments 
have so long been carried on that the construction of dA and dC over known sets of affects 
and cognates is probably implicit in the corresponding experimental data. (In fact early 
in this century (about 1910) C. J. Jung together with E. Bleuler conducted response as- 
sociation experiments; see Freud [2].) 
Syntactic integrity 
Defining syntactic integrity prerequires defining noun and verb. The psychical definition 
of a noun Nis its set of cognitive attributes {c(N),}; that is, an object is equated (cognitively) 
with its attributes and only its attributes. For the present purposes a verb v is an entity 
that acts on an object ol to produce an object 02: write ol 71 02. (As will be seen shortly 
this does not exclude intransitive or reflexive verbs.) 
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More generally, a verb is characterized by transforming a set of objects, say OD (D 
for domain), into a set of objects 0, (R for range). However the domain OD and the range 
OR are themselves characterized by sharing certain affects. That is the class OD -which 
is numerically large-is more appropriately defined by the (fewer) affects which all its 
elements share; likewise for OR. This leads to the following: 
Definition 1 A noun is a set of cognitive attributes. 
Definition 2 A verb is a transformation from one set of affects to another: a verb 
transforms any object representative of the one set of affects to an object representative 
of the other set of affects. 
Corollary Psychically a verb transforms one object into another by achieving a change 
of affectual state. 
For example, if one says “I carried a chair from the bedroom to the dining room,” 
then the change of state is from how the affects of the first location are regarded to how 
the affects of the second are regarded. Or if one says “I bought a newspaper,” then the 
change of state is from the affects of desiring the newspaper to those of possessing it. An 
intransitive example: “She becomes happy at the sight of sunshine.” The change of af- 
fectual state is obvious here. 
The sentences S referred to are primitively of the form ol 11 o2 (intransitive and reflexive 
verbs included), where ol and 02 are object representatives of C and zj is a verb of W or 
an affectual relative of it. More generally, since ol ‘11 o2 means begin with one state and 
transform to another it is clear that ol 11 o2 can be regarded as the object given by the 
final (transformed) state. This implies that ol (the object acted on) can itself be a primitive 
sentence of the form 0; 11 oi; likewise for 02. Hence S is formed by recursively combining 
primitives of the form ol u 02. The definition below will be justified: 
Definition 3 The sentence S is said to have syntactic integrity if it contains at least 
one primitive ol v o2 for which ol is an appropriate object representative for the domain 
of u and o2 is an appropriate object representative for the range of 71. (Note that appro- 
priateness is determined by the affects of ol ; likewise o2 .) 
This may appear to be a minimal requirement but in recalling that creative formulation 
precedes action and that the means of carrying out a reality experiment must be known 
it is apparent that no S could be tested without a requirement of this kind. Furthermore 
the reduction to at least one primitive of the form ol 11 o2 as indicated allows for action 
(and hence feedback) in a state of urgency whether of real or pathological origin. Of course 
the smaller the element of nuance in W the more S can be expected to have several 
appropriate primitives; inversely, the more novel W is the fewer appropriate primitives 
S will tend to have. 
The most complete treatment of S formation would proceed analogously to the above 
for adjective, adverb, conjunction, preposition, and exclamation. However the psychical 
meaning of these grammatical primitives is not necessary for the present discussion which 
is an approximation to a complete model. In the symbolic model presented S is assumed 
to be of the form ol 11 02. Also, the more complete secondary process revikw of S is 
omitted because 
1) it is a well explored area of human cognitive ability, 
2) a detailed mathematical representation of language, though feasible, would obscure 
the essentials of the mechanism of creativity and 
3) the completion of the present model with such an addition is self-defining. 
The creative mechanism: an analytic model 
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